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“Everything you can imagine is real.” 
Pablo Picasso
Introduction
This quote by the famous painter Pablo Picasso summarizes the findings of this article: “Everything 
you can imagine is real” can be translated into international criminal law and the crime of genocide, 
in that even an imagined group membership can become real, despite originating in the imagination 
of the perpetrator. The social relevance of a group becomes legally relevant, if the group is treated 
as real and acquires an identity of its own. Identity is at the heart of every genocide and crucial to 
explain the crime.1 Individuals are targeted on the basis of their actual or perceived association to a 
group, even if the perpetrator’s perception of the victim group is “wildly inaccurate”.2
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) defines the crime of genocide as 
follows: “‘genocide’ means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or 
in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such…”.3 This article will primarily focus 
on the racial group, yet in the context of the overall group membership of the victims of genocide. 
Where it appears appropriate and legally correct, the general analysis of the group membership 
will be applied to the racial group.
In the crime of genocide, the perpetrator selects and targets his victims because of their 
membership to a certain group. In order to convict a perpetrator for the crime of genocide, 
the courts have to prove that the victims belonged to one of the four protected groups. David 
Nersessian correctly recognizes that “[i]f an individual lacks membership in a protected group, 
genocide cannot occur with respect to that victim”.4 The case studies of Cambodia and Rwanda 
will subsequently demonstrate the difficulties of determining the victims of genocide as members 
of a national, ethnical, racial or religious group. International criminal tribunals have largely tried to 
avoid defining group membership and in particular race. While sociology and anthropology, together 
with other disciplines, successfully adopted a contemporary approach to race as the perception of 
differentness,5 international criminal law is showing great discomfort with collective identities.
1 David Moshman, “Us and Them: Identity and Genocide,” Identity: An International Journal of Theory and Research 7, No. 2 
(2007), 116.
2 Moshman, “Us and Them”, 116.
3 Art. 6 of the Rome Statute of the ICC, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9 of 17 July 1998.
4 David Nersessian, Genocide and Political Groups (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 21.
5 Lawrence Bobo, Foreword to Revisiting Race in a Genomic Age, by Barbara Koenig, Sandra Soo-Jin Lee and Sarah 
S. Richardson (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2008) , x. David Berreby, Us and Them: The Science of 
Identity (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2008). Rogers Brubaker, “The Dolezal Affair: Race, Gender, 
and the Micropolitics of Identity,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 39 (2016), 414-448. Rogers Brubaker, “Ethnicity, Race, 
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The theory of imagined identities originates from Benedict Anderson’s acclaimed book 
Imagined Communities6 and is an innovative method for determining the victim groups of genocide. 
The theory builds on a subjective approach based on the involved persons’ perception, particularly 
the perpetrator’s perception of the victim group. Such subjective approaches are commonplace 
in socio-anthropology for the definition of group membership in general and for the definition 
of a racial group in particular.7 The application of this approach by the international judiciary is, 
however, a recent development. One of its greatest benefits is the avoidance of objective parameters 
such as skin color, thus finally breaking with contentious means of objectively defining race.8 The 
assessment and clarification of the subjective approach, with help of the theory of imagined identity, 
is the objective of this paper. It will furthermore show how the theory of imagined identities applies 
to cases of genocide.
Nonetheless, a subjective approach to defining the racial victim group has to be brought into 
conformity with the principle of legality, particularly its elements of specificity and foreseeability, 
which will be examined in the next section. Following the review of the principle of legality, 
this article will look at how legal scholarship deals with race. Thereafter the theory of imagined 
identities is presented, as well as its application to genocidal cases. The jurisprudence by the ad 
hoc international criminal tribunals, namely the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY)9 and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR),10 on the victim 
groups of genocide is then analyzed. The definition of genocide by the Commission of Inquiry 
on Violations of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law in Darfur (Darfur 
Commission) is also scrutinized.11 The Darfur Commission made a major contribution to defining 
the group membership in the crime of genocide by applying the theory of imagined identities. As 
such, it opened up for the application of this theory to future cases before the ICC, which still is in 
its infancy with regard to prosecutions of the crime of genocide.12
The Implications of the Principle of Legality
The principle of legality requires that an accused is not held guilty unless his act or omission 
constituted a crime under law at the time and location of its commission.13 The principle is 
construed to prevent the punishment for acts, which were reasonably believed not to be criminal 
when committed.14
Already in 1946, the Nuremberg Tribunal observed in its judgment against the major war 
criminals that a fundamental principle of all law, international as well as domestic, was that there 
and Nationalism,” Annual Review of Sociology 35 (2009), 21–42. Kurt Glaser and Stefan Possony, Victims of Politics: 
The State of Human Rights (New York, Columbia University Press, 1979), 67. In 2000, the US census introduced self-
identification, thus perception, regarding racial categorization in asking “What is this person’s race? Mark one or 
more races to indicate what this person considers himself/herself to be”. Cited in Michael Banton, What We Know about 
Race and Ethnicity (New York: Berghahn Books, 2015), 2.
6 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 2006).
7 For example race scholar Paul Gilroy talks about “the imagined community of a racialized group”, Paul Gilroy, Against 
Race: Imagining Political Culture Beyond the Color Line (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), 38.
8 Caroline Fournet, The Crime of Destruction and the Law of Genocide: Their Impact on Collective Memory (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2007), 59. Gilroy, Against Race, 37 asks “if ‘race’ is a useful way of classifying people, then how many ‘races’ are 
there?”.
9 Established by Security Council Resolution S/RES/827 (25 May 1993). Official title: International Tribunal for the 
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the 
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991.
10 Established by Security Council Resolution S/RES/955 (8 November 1994). Official title: International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian 
Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such 
Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighboring States between 1 January and 31 December 1994.
11 UN Security Council Resolution, UN Doc. S/RES/1564 (2004) of 18 September 2004.
12 The ICC has to date not dealt with the protected groups of genocide.
13 Theodor Meron, War Crimes Law Comes of Age: Essays (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 244-245.
14 Meron, War Crimes Law, 245; The Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, Trial Chamber Judgment, December 5, 2003, IT-98-29-T, 
para. 93.
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could be no punishment for a crime without a pre-existing law, and furthermore that “the maxim 
nullum crimen sine lege is not a limitation of sovereignty, but is in general a principle of justice”.15 
Nowadays the maxim is more than just a principle of justice; it is an internationally recognized 
human right, embedded in the right to a fair trial.16 The principle of legality, whereby individuals 
may not be punished if their conduct had not been previously criminalized by law,
has been so extensively proclaimed in international human rights treaties with regard to 
domestic legal systems and so frequently upheld by international criminal courts with 
regard to international prosecution of crimes, that it is warranted to hold that by now it has 
the status of a peremptory norm (jus cogens).17
Nullum crimen sine lege has transformed into a rule of law that fundamentally influenced 
international criminal law.18 While the principle is not explicitly enshrined in the Statutes of the 
ad hoc international criminal tribunals, it is contained in Arts. 22-24 of the Rome Statute of the 
ICC. Under the heading “General Principles of Criminal Law”, the Statute specifically lists nullum 
crimen sine lege (Art. 22), nulla poena sine lege (Art. 23), according to which no punishment may be 
imposed except as provided by law and, lastly, nulla poena sine praevia lege (Art. 24) or, no penalty 
without previous law.19 The Rome Statute makes clear that the principle of legality consists of 
several elements, namely the strict construction of the definition of a crime, the prohibition of 
extension by analogy and in dubio pro reo, whereby in case of ambiguity the definition shall be 
interpreted in favor of the person under investigation or prosecution (Art. 22 (2)).
The principle of legality restricts any excessive interpretative activity in that the judges must 
respect its most important corollaries: the principle of strict construction and in dubio pro reo (when 
in doubt, for the accused).20 Due to the principle of strict construction, the judges may not adopt 
a method of interpretation that unduly broadens the definition of the crimes. In other words: 
the respective provision may only be applied to conduct that the drafters expressly intended to 
criminalize.21
The principle of legality is twofold: first, a criminal law provision needs to be sufficiently clear 
and specific for the perpetrator to foresee that he could become criminally liable, thereby giving 
him the opportunity to adjust his behavior in order to avoid sanctions.22 Secondly, the law has to 
be unambiguous and accessible for judges to render uniform and coherent judgments, without 
expansively interpreting the respective provisions. The latter also serves the purpose of protecting 
citizens from arbitrary judicial actions.23 There remain therefore two opposites: on the one hand, the 
principle of legality imposes interpretative boundaries. On the other hand, a broad interpretation 
may protect more victims. Thus, while the judges may interpret and apply the law on the crime of 
genocide, they are not permitted to create new law by means of expansive judicial interpretation. 
The interpretation of race is therefore limited to what the drafters intended to criminalize and 
cannot go beyond what is understood to be a racial group.
The theory of imagined identities challenges the principle of legality in several ways. The 
narrow definition of the crime of genocide will inevitably be broadened if the group membership is 
15 Nuremberg International Military Tribunal (IMT), Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the IMT, Judgment 
(November 14, 1945 - October 1, 1946), Official Text in the English Language (1947), 219.
16 Kenneth Gallant, The Principle of Legality in International and Comparative Criminal Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), 3. Beth Van Schaack, “Crimen Sine Lege: Judicial Lawmaking at the Intersection of Law and 
Morals”, Georgetown Law Journal 97 (2008), 124.
17 The Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, 
Perpetration, Cumulative Charging, February 16, 2011, STL-11-01/I/AC/R176bis, para. 76.
18 Gallant, Principle of Legality, 3.
19 Ibid., 12.
20 The Prosecutor v. Katanga, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, March 7, 2014, ICC-01/04-01/07, para. 51.
21 Ibid.
22 Van Schaack, ‘Crimen Sine Lege’, 121.
23 Ibid.,
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defined by the perpetrator’s perception. From initially protecting four exclusive groups, the ambit 
of the provision would be expanded to cover any victim perceived as belonging to one of the four 
groups. Richard Ashby Wilson points to the challenges that a perception-based approach might 
entail: “If a group’s existence is not a fact but a changeable chimera dependent on a subjective 
state of mind, then the whole edifice of the [ICTR]’s mandate to prosecute the crime of genocide 
is potentially undermined”.24 By basing a legal definition on the perpetrator’s perception, the 
principle of strict construction and the related element of specificity are challenged. The principle 
of foreseeability is also affected, since the application of the criminal provision cannot possibly be 
foreseen if its content is fully dependent on a person’s perception or imagination. This article will 
demonstrate that the theory of imagined identities nevertheless is compatible with the principle 
of legality, despite pushing its boundaries. It is an innovative, yet legitimate legal tool for the 
identification of the victim groups in the crime of genocide. The next section will give an insight 
into the historical development of race and its protection by the Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of Genocide (Genocide Convention),25 before further discussing the theory of 
imagined identities.
The Authoritative Source: The Genocide Convention
The proponents of different social studies often employ the term genocide more broadly as the 
intended mass killing of a group of people.26 International criminal law - bound by the principle of 
strict legality - limits its protection against genocide to the racial, ethnical, religious and national 
groups. In order to convict a perpetrator of the crime of genocide, all the legal elements of the crime 
have to be fulfilled, including the protected victim group.27 The narrow definition of genocide and 
the four protected groups is definitive for legal purposes, although it is seen as seriously flawed by 
non-legal genocide scholars.28
During the drafting of the Rome Statute of the ICC, the state delegates made clear that the 
1948 Genocide Convention contained a generally acceptable definition of the crime of genocide 
that could and should be used in the Statute.29 Indeed, genocide was the only crime that received a 
quick and unanimous consensus without any further discussion on what defines a racial group.30 
Not only Art. 6 Rome Statute, but also the respective provisions in the ICTY and ICTR Statute are 
verbatim to Art. II Genocide Convention. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has furthermore 
declared that Art. II Genocide Convention is customary international law and jus cogens,31 making 
24 Richard Ashby Wilson, “Crimes against Humanity and the Conundrum of Race and Ethnicity at the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,” in In the Name of Humanity: The Government of Threat and Care, ed. Ilana Feldman and 
Miriam Ticktin (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), 52.
25 Adopted by Resolution 260 (III)A of the UN General Assembly on December 9, 1948.
26 Examples include: Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and Case Studies (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 23. Alexander Laban Hinton, “The Dark Side of Modernity,” in Annihilating 
Difference: the Anthropology of Genocide, ed. Alexander Laban Hinton (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 
4. See also David Lisson, “Defining ‘National Group’ in the Genocide Convention: a Case Study of Timor-Leste,” 
Stanford Law Review (2008), 1463, providing a brief summary of different approaches to the definition of genocide that 
have no legal force.
27 There are diverging views as to whether the victim group is an objective or subjective element. Some include the victim 
groups into the mens rea, while others see the victim group as an element of the actus reus. The wording of Art. II 
Genocide Convention suggests the latter, since the element of a ‘group’ is part of each genocidal act. For example, Art. 
II(a) reads: “Killing members of the group”. The group is therefore part of the objective elements of the crime. See for 
further discussion: Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 138.
28 Moshman, “Us and Them”, 116.
29 M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Legislative History of the International Criminal Court, Summary Records of the 1998 Diplomatic 
Conference (New York: Transnational Publishers, 2005), 92, note 20.
30 Hermann Von Hebel and Darryl Robinson, “Crimes Within the Jurisdiction of the Court,” in The International Criminal 
Court: The Making of the Rome Statute - Issues, Negotiations, Results, ed. Roy Lee (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 
1999), 89.
31 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, ICJ Advisory Opinion (1951) 
23. Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), New 
Application: 2002, ICJ Judgment (February 3, 2006), para. 64 with reference to Application of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia). ICJ Judgment on Preliminary 
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its content definitive for any legal analysis of the crime. The following discussion of the crime of 
genocide and the protected victim groups is therefore based on Art. II Genocide Convention as the 
authoritative definition.
The travaux préparatoires to the Genocide Convention reveal that the four protected groups - the 
national, ethnical, racial and religious group - were intended to be an exhaustive list. The drafters 
considered them to be cohesive, stable and permanent.32 Therefore these groups merited more 
protection than loose groups to which membership could be easily gained or renounced, such as 
political groups.33 While there undoubtedly were political reasons to exclude political groups from 
the protection of the Genocide Convention, the International Law Commission in 1996 restated that 
the exclusion occurred because “this type of group was not considered to be sufficiently stable”.34
Historical research shows that the idea of race always carried more meanings than mere 
physical differences. In fact, physical variations in the human species have no meaning except 
the social values that humans apply to them.35 David Davis concludes that “[l]ike serfdom, social 
castes, and royal or noble ‘blood’, concepts of race influence perception, including self-perception, 
and can above all represent a shared historical experience, such as the African Americans in the 
United States”.36 Perception is of paramount importance for the legal definition of a racial group in 
the crime of genocide, as this article will demonstrate.
The so-called races of humankind are recognized to be incidental and arbitrary social 
mechanisms invented during the eighteenth century; they helped organize the populations 
encountered and conquered during European colonialism.37 Thus, race became a by-product of 
Europe’s religious, economic and imperial expansion during colonialism.38 However, Benedict 
Anderson, the author of Imagined Communities, disagrees that race originates in colonialism; and 
instead finds its origin in ideologies of class, for example, the claim of contamination of  “white” 
or “blue” (aristocratic) blood by inferior (racial) classes.39 The idea of blood purity has transgressed 
many societies, for instance, during the Jim Crow legislation in the United States, when most 
Southern states adopted the “one-drop rule”, according to which an individual with any black 
ancestry was deemed black.40
When the Genocide Convention was drafted, the contemporary understanding of race heavily 
influenced its legal correlative. The reference to races was not uncommon at the time. Indeed, race 
was perceived as a combination of two concepts. The first concept embraces the notion of nation 
states as well as sub-groups of people.41 The second concept contains the idea of biologically distinct 
races, determined by their bloodline.42 The Polish-Jewish lawyer, Raphael Lemkin, created the term 
Objections (1996), para. 31.
32 UN Doc. A/C.6./SR.74 (October 15, 1948).
33 Ibid. William Schabas, Genocide in International Law, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 117, 151, 
153-160.
34 International Law Commission (ILC), Report of the ILC on the work of its forty-eighth session, UN Doc. A/51/10, 45 
(1996).
35 American Anthropological Association (AAA). Statement on ‘Race’ (1998), accessed April 7, 2016, http://www.aaanet.org/
stmts/racepp.htm.
36 David Davis, “Constructing Race: A Reflection”, The William and Mary Quarterly (1997), 7.
37 Richard Cooper, Jay Kaufman and Ryk Ward, “Race and Genomics,” New England Journal of Medicine (2003), 1166; 
AAA, Statement on ‘Race’.
38 Davis, “Constructing Race”, 7.
39 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 149.
40 Ian Haney López, White by Law: The Legal Construction of Race (New York: New York University Press, 2006), 83. Banton, 
Race and Ethnicity, 2. Sharona Hoffman, “Is There a Place for “Race” as a Legal Concept?,” Arizona State Law Journal 
(2004), 1129-1130.
41 Diane Amann confirms that race was used in the then-current fashion to describe European subgroups, like the 
Germans, Poles and the Jews (Diane Amann, “Group Mentality, Expressivism, and Genocide,” International 
Criminal Law Review (2002), 98). William Schabas, “Groups Protected by the Genocide Convention,” ILSA Journal for 
International and Comparative Law (2000), 381.
42 This can be inferred from the fact that the Genocide Convention was drafted in reaction to the Holocaust, and as such 
was influenced by historical facts (Machteld Boot, Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes: Nullum Crimen Sine 
Lege and the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (Antwerpen, Intersentia (2002)), 417).
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genocide by combining two words genos (ancient Greek for race or tribe) and cide (from the Latin 
word caedere for to kill).43 Lemkin’s study Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, which first formulated the 
proposed crime of genocide, illustrates that the different European nations or subgroups like the 
Germans, Poles and Jews were seen as different races.44
Yet the concept of race was also shaped by the Nazi racial ideology. The Holocaust was still 
ongoing when Lemkin published his book, and undoubtedly the Nazi propaganda terminology 
influenced his use of the term race. The Nazi racial ideology demanded the purity of the Aryan 
blood. Adolf Hitler created the concept a homogenous German people as the Aryan master race 
(the so-called Herrenrasse) in an attempt to justify genocide as a sacred purpose of the biologically 
superior German people.45 Differences between the Aryan and Jewish race were “biologized into 
an immutable physiological essence that could not be changed”.46 As such, the Jewish race was 
portrayed as unhuman, a threat to the Aryan race and had therefore to be completely destroyed.47 
The Nazi racial legislation in the Nuremberg laws48 determined Jewry according to blood 
relationship and in particular as far back as grandparental inheritance.49 Races were accordingly 
defined by biology and heredity.
In the past fifty years, the concept of race has changed considerably. In particular, the conflation 
of race with nationality has ceased. Nowadays it would be rather surprising if anyone referred to 
the Poles, Dutch or Jews as a separate race. The scientific progress in genetics and biology of the 
past decades determined that there is no gene for race and that it is scientifically incorrect to speak 
of different human races.50 In its final report, the Commission of Experts on Rwanda emphasized 
that “to recognize that there exists discrimination on racial or ethnic grounds, it is not necessary 
to presume or posit the existence of race or ethnicity itself as a scientifically objective fact”.51 
Colloquially, however, the meaning of race is still very much linked to the outer appearance of 
people, particularly skin color. In conclusion it can be noted that there are no biologically different 
human races.52 Yet people’s features are still commonly used to determine their race. The next 
section reveals the limitations of the Genocide Convention, especially when the victim group is not 
easily defined as a national, racial, ethnical or religious group.
Practical Significance: Rwanda and Cambodia
The designation of a genocidal victim to one of the four protected groups is not only of theoretical 
importance; the group membership of the victim is an element of the crime of genocide.53 If the 
victim cannot be classified as a member of a racial, ethnical, national or religious group, the crime 
43 Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress (Washington: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of International Law, 1944), 79.
44 Lemkin, Axis Rule in Europe, 87-88.
45 Henry Jr. King, “Genocide and Nuremberg,” in The Criminal Law of Genocide, ed. Ralph Henham and Paul Behrens (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2007), 30.
46 Hinton, “Dark Side of Modernity”, 14.
47 Lemkin, Axis Rule in Europe, 81, 86-87. Scott Straus affirms that Lemkin grounded his work in the Nazis’ commission of 
genocide based on their preoccupation with biology (Scott Straus, “Contested Meanings and Conflicting Imperatives: 
a Conceptual Analysis of Genocide,” Journal of Genocide Research (2001), 365.
48 The Nuremberg laws consisted of two distinct laws, resulting in a direct order from Hitler: the Reich citizenship law 
(Reichsbürgergesetz) and The Law for the Protection of German Blood and German Honor (Gesetz zum Schutz des 
deutschen Blutes und der deutschen Ehre).
49 The definition of a German Reich citizen is contained in Art. 2(1) of the Reichsbürgergesetz Reichsgesetzblatt (September 
16, 1935), 1146, accessed April 1, 2016, published by the Austrian National Library: http://alex.onb.ac.at/cgi-content/ale
x?apm=0&aid=dra&datum=19350004&seite=00001146&zoom=2.
50 No genes have been identified that are shared by all members of one “race” (and hence could explain a common racial 
appearance) that are not also present at substantial levels in other races (thereby failing to sort individuals into races), 
see: Leda Cosmides, John Tooby and Robert Kurzban, “Perceptions of Race,” Trends in Cognitive Sciences (2003), 173. 
For more insight into the discussion: Hoffman, “‘Race’ as a Legal Concept?”, 1093-1159.
51 United Nations, Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 935 (1994), 
December 9, 1994 (UN Doc. S/1995/1405, Annex, para. 159).
52 Michael Banton, Racial Theories (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 196, 212.
53 See footnote 27.
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is legally not genocide. Two examples illustrate the practical significance of the narrow protection 
awarded by the Genocide Convention: Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge from 1975-1979 and 
Rwanda during the 1994 genocide. These examples will not specifically deal with the racial group. 
Instead, they intend to show the difficulties to determine the groups protected by the Genocide 
Convention.
The atrocities committed in Cambodia by the Khmer Rouge regime have occasionally been 
labelled auto-genocide since the Khmer Rouge regime targeted parts of its own citizens.54 Most 
victims were intellectuals, bourgeoisie, other political or social class enemies, as well as urban 
residents, and belonged to the Khmer majority group.55 A 1985 UN report concluded that the 
definition of genocide did not exclude cases, in which the victims were part of the violator’s 
own group.56 Indeed, the perpetrators and the majority of the victims were members of the same 
nationality, religion, ethnicity and race: they were all Khmer. The crimes committed were possibly 
not genocidal acts, because they targeted primarily political, economic or social groups.57 But the 
Khmer Rouge regime also targeted ethnic Vietnamese and the Cham Muslim minority group.58 
The charges in the trial at the UN-backed Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 
(ECCC) against Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan (Case 002/02) include genocide against these two 
minority groups only, precisely because of the limitations of the Genocide Convention to protect 
four exhaustive categories of groups.59 In 1999, a UN report by a Group of Experts classified “the 
Muslim Cham as an ethnic and religious group; the Vietnamese communities as an ethnic and, 
perhaps, a racial group; and the Buddhist monkhood as a religious group”.60 The report reads 
furthermore: “whether the Khmer Rouge committed genocide with respect to part of the Khmer 
national group turns on complex interpretative issues, especially concerning the Khmer Rouge’s 
intent with respect to its non-minority-group victims”.61 The Group of Experts did not further 
qualify the crimes committed. The trial in the case 002/02 before the ECCC will have to reach a 
verdict whether the Khmer Rouge committed genocide and whether the victims fall under one of 
the four protected groups. The indictment did not include genocide against the Khmer national 
group. Thus, the likely outcome is a conviction of the accused for genocide against the Muslim 
Cham and the Vietnamese minority groups.
The other example that shows the narrow protection of the Genocide Convention is Rwanda. 
There was a risk that the perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide would be acquitted because their 
victims could not be qualified as members of an ethnical, racial, national or religious group. Indeed, 
one of the main challenges for the ICTR was the classification of the Hutu and Tutsi as two distinct 
groups, as subsequent sections of this paper will discuss. Technically speaking, the Tutsi and Hutu 
did not belong to different ethnicities.62 According to Katy Grady “it is virtually impossible, on an 
objective, factual level, to distinguish between Tutsi and Hutu”.63 Other scholars suggest that the 
54 Fournet, Crime of Destruction, 48. Payam Akhavan, Reducing Genocide to Law: Definition, Meaning, and the Ultimate Crime 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 133.
55 Ben Kiernan, Blood and Soil: A World History of Genocide and Extermination from Sparta to Darfur (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2007), 546-547.
56 Benjamin Whitaker, Revised and Updated Report on the Question of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
July 2, 1985 (UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/6, para. 31).
57 Steven Ratner and Jason Abrams, Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in International Law: Beyond the Nuremberg 
Legacy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 306-312; Akhavan, Reducing Genocide to Law, 134.
58 Schabas, Genocide in International Law, 149-150. Nersessian, Genocide and Political Groups, 90. 
59 “Case 002/02,” Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, accessed May 18, 2016, http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/
case/topic/1299.
60 United Nations, Report of the Group of Experts for Cambodia Established Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 52/135, 
March 15, 1999 (UN Doc. A/53/850 and S/1999/231, Annex, para. 63).
61 Ibid., para. 65.
62 The Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Trial Chamber Judgment, September 2, 1998, ICTR-96-4-T, para. 516. William Schabas, “The 
Crime of Genocide in the Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda,” in International and National Prosecution of Crimes Under International Law, ed. Horst Fischer, Claus Kress and 
Sascha Rolf Lüder (Berlin: Berlin Verlag, 2001, 450). Amann, “Group Mentality”, 94.
63 Katy Grady, “The Genocide Convention’s Protected Groups: A Place for Gender?” in Protecting Humanity: Essays in 
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Hutu and Tutsi might be two distinct races: William Schabas notes that the category of racial group 
“might have seemed the best choice, but some of the judges were probably uncomfortable with 
the notion itself and its whiff of racism”64 or, in other words, “general discomfort with the term 
‘racial group’ may explain why the ICTR was reluctant to classify the Tutsi as a racial group”.65 
Van den Herik agrees that “[the Tutsi] would probably have fitted the description of a racial group 
better”,66 as do Nagan and Rodin who assert that “perhaps race was a defining element in the 
tardy commitment to the Rwandan tribunal”.67 Subsequent sections will discuss how the ICTR 
categorized the Tutsi victims of the Rwandan genocide. But not only Tutsi became victims of the 
atrocities. Hutu moderates, who sympathized with the Tutsi, were also targeted. Since the Hutu 
were not targeted for reasons of group membership, but rather for taking a political stance, these 
crimes could not be legally qualified as genocide.68
Four Corner Posts
There is an ongoing scholarly debate as to the usefulness of distinguishing the four protected 
groups.69 William Schabas suggests using the four terms - national, ethnical, racial and religious 
- as “four corner posts that delimit an area within which a [sic] myriad of groups covered by the 
Convention find protection”,70 whereby the groups are in a dynamic and synergistic relationship, 
each contributing to the construction of the other.71 This approach, which sees no need to definitively 
assign the victim to one particular group, because of multiple group characteristics, has also been 
called ensemble or holistic approach.72 There is undoubtedly a risk of an overlap between the four 
categories. However, the creation of a generic, undefined group contradicts the internationally 
recognized maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat, where each word in a legal text carries its distinct 
meaning.73 Difficulties in defining the protected groups should not lead to creating an undefined 
area, in which myriad of groups are contained within the four corner posts of nationality, ethnicity, 
race and religion. The intention of the Genocide Convention’s drafters was to limit the protection 
to racial, ethnical, national and religious groups. The expansion of the Convention to an undefined 
number of groups would contradict its objective of a restrictive application.74 Lars Berster considers 
such a de facto dissolution of a key element of the crime not to be reconcilable with the principle of 
legality.75
International Law and Policy in Honour of Navanethem Pillay, ed. Chile Eboe-Osuji (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2010), 177.
64 William Schabas, “Judicial Activism and the Crime of Genocide,” in Judicial Creativity at the International Criminal 
Tribunals, ed. Shane Darcy and Joseph Powderly (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 71.
65 Schabas, “Groups Protected”, 380.
66 Larissa Van den Herik, The Contribution of the Rwanda Tribunal to the Development of International Law (Leiden: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 2005), 129.
67 Winston Nagan and Vivile Rodin, “Racism, Genocide, and Mass Murder: Towards a Legal Theory about Group 
Deprivations,” National Black Law Journal (2002-2004), 216.
68 The Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Trial Chamber Judgment, September 2, 1998, ICTR-96-4-T, para. 721. Nersessian, Genocide and 
Political Groups, 21.
69 Schabas, Genocide in International Law, 129. Amann, “Group Mentality”, 109-113. Peter Quayle, “Unimaginable Evil: The 
Legislative Limitations of the Genocide Convention,” International Criminal Law Review (2005), 370. Gerhard Werle, 
Principles of International Criminal Law (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2005), 194. Allard K. Lowenstein International 
Human Rights Clinic, Yale Law School, Persecution of the Rohingya Muslims: Is Genocide Occurring in Myanmar’s Rakhine 
State? A Legal Analysis (2015), 41. Claus, Kress, “The Crime of Genocide Under International Law,” International 
Criminal Law Review (2006), 475.
70 Schabas, Genocide in International Law, 129.
71 Ibid. 
72 Amann, “Group Mentality”, 109-113. Lars Berster, “Article II,” in Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide: A Commentary, ed. Christian Tams, Lars Berster and Björn Schiffbauer (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2014), 102. 
Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law, 194.
73 Kress, “The Crime of Genocide”, 475. Berster, “Article II”, 102. John Quigley, The Genocide Convention: An International 
Law Analysis (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 149.
74 Matthew Lippman, “Genocide: The Crime of the Century,” Houston Journal of International Law 23 (2000), 476.
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Another argument against an ensemble approach is the fact that the genocidal perpetrator 
defines his victims by reducing their identity to what he perceives to be specific group identity 
markers. The victims are reduced to one aspect of their identity and stigmatized because of that 
particular dimension, thereby rendering other dimensions of their identity marginal.76 Such process 
occurred, for example, in Germany prior to the Holocaust. The Nazi ideology determined that the 
Jews were a distinct group and could no longer be part of the racially defined German nation. Their 
Jewishness became the defining identity marker.77 It is, in other words, the perpetrator’s perception 
of the victims that determines whether or not they are covered by the protection of Art. II Genocide 
Convention. Helen Klann and Phillipa KcKenzie note that “in cases where it is unclear whether a 
victim belonged to a protected group, the perception of the perpetrator is most relevant. Where 
the perpetrator perceived the victim as belonging to a group, the victim should be considered to 
belong to that group”.78 Caroline Fournet emphasizes that the Genocide Convention “wrongly 
affords protection to ‘racial’ groups, in spite of the fact that there are no such groups except in the 
minds of the perpetrators”.79 The perpetrator identifies his victims by what he perceives to be their 
decisive characteristic.
According to the Darfur Commission, the principle of effectiveness dictated that international 
rules were to be given maximum effect – or in its Latin terms ut res magis valeat quam pereat, thereby 
suggesting that Art. II Genocide Convention should be construed as effectively as possible, 
in light of its object and purpose.80 The ICJ recognized the principle of effectiveness as “one of 
the fundamental principles of interpretation of treaties, consistently upheld by international 
jurisprudence”.81 According to this principle, the terms of a treaty are ensured effectiveness in 
consideration of its object and purpose together with good faith, the so-called effet utile.82 Hence, 
Art. II Genocide Convention has to be interpreted effectively, giving maximum effect to all the 
protected groups, including the racial group. In sum, an ensemble approach that delimits a broader 
area of protection is inconsistent with the principle of legality, the principle of effectiveness, and 
the perpetrator’s perception of the victim group. The four corner post-approach is flawed and 
therefore not ideal.
The following section gives an overview on how legal scholarship and the jurisprudence of the 
ad hoc ICTY and ICTR have defined the protected groups of genocide. It will reveal the great legal 
uncertainty that exists about the nature of human differences.
Race and Legal Scholarship
What Is Race?
There is no gene for race. There exist no genes that are shared by all members of one race and that 
could explain a common racial appearance; no DNA has been identified that is not also present 
at substantial levels in other races, thereby failing to sort individuals into different racial groups.83 
Instead, it has become accepted that races are social constructs rather than a biological given.84 At 
76 Nersessian, Genocide and Political Groups, 29. Moshman, “Us and Them”, 118-119.
77 Moshman, “Us and Them”, 120.
78 Helen Klann and Phillipa McKenzie, “Judge Laïty Kama: Five Cases to Develop International Criminal Law,” in 
From Human Rights to International Criminal Law: Studies in Honour of an African Jurist, the Late Judge Laïty Kama, ed. 
Emmanuel Decaux, Adama Dieng and Malick Sow (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Pubishers, 2007), 28.
79 Fournet, Crime of Destruction, 59.
80 United Nations, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, January 25, 2005 (UN Doc. S/2005/60), para. 
494.
81 Case Concerning the Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Chad), ICJ Judgment (1994), 25. Similarly, a Separate 
Opinion to the Jelisić judgment claimed it was “a general rule of interpretation that the law must be interpreted in 
such a way that it has useful effect (the principle of effectiveness, or ut res magis valeat quam pereat)”, The Prosecutor v. 
Jelisić, Appeals Chamber Judgment, Separate Opinion of Judge Nieto-Navia, December 14, 1999, IT-95-10-A, para. 12.
82 Mark Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2009), 428.
83 Cosmides, Tooby and Kurzban, “Perceptions of Race”, 173. Bobo, “Foreword”, x. Hoffman, “‘Race’ as a Legal 
Concept?”, 1093-1159.
84 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), “Statement on Race” (1950) “For all 
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a White House ceremony, even genome sequencer Craig Venter said: “The concept of race has no 
genetic or scientific basis”.85 His colleague, Francis Collins further emphasized that “[t]hose who 
wish to draw precise racial boundaries around certain groups will not be able to use science as a 
legitimate justification”.86
The differing physical appearance of people may be biologically heritable, yet the practical 
importance of what we understand as race derives from the human capacity to create and assign 
meanings.87 For international criminal law and the crime of genocide, the practical importance of 
race lies in why the victim group is targeted and whether the perpetrator believed that the victims 
were members of a group racially distinct from his own.
Despite the non-existence of different biologically defined human races, surprisingly many 
legal scholars define racial groups by means of hereditary external features, as the following 
examples will show. By relying on complexion, the victims of the crime of genocide are classified 
objectively. However, do all people with dark skin belong to the same race? Is it correct to objectively 
group the victims according to their appearance?
The concept of race causes difficulties to international criminal law because of the legal 
necessity of an objective determination of the victim’s group membership. In order to achieve a 
conviction for the crime of genocide, the prosecution has to prove that the perpetrator targeted a 
national, religious, ethnical or racial group. This requirement leads courts to objectively defining 
race based on the victim’s complexion. As long as the racial group is considered a material element 
of a crime, it has to be objectively determinable. As a result, international criminal courts resort to 
outdated ways of classifying human beings.
Instead of reverting to controversial ways of defining different human races by means 
externally perceptible attributes, race should be defined as the perception of a person’s differentness. 
This subjective approach, according to which perception rather than objectively discernable 
characteristics are decisive, is precisely what the theory of imagined identities relies upon. Before 
discussing the theory of imagined identities, the next section will show how race is understood by 
legal scholarship.
Legal Scholarship on race
The following examples illustrate the current legal scholarship on race in international criminal 
law. Hans Vest refers to physical characteristics or biological ancestry when defining race,88 while 
Lawrence LeBlanc defines race as “associated with physical characteristics of a people such as color 
of skin”.89 Daniel Ntanda Nsereko classifies different “racial groups (…) according to genetically 
transmitted differences”90 and “[e]ach group has physical features that are hereditary [including] 
practical social purposes, ‘race’ is not so much a biological phenomenon as social myth”, in Four Statements on the Race 
Question, ed. UNESCO (1969), 33. The 1967 UNESCO statement confirms that “racist doctrines lack any scientific basis 
whatsoever” (UNESCO, “Statement on Race and Racial Prejudice of 1967,” in Four Statements on the Race Question, ed. 
UNESCO (1969).  
Even the International Haplotype Map Project, which is a multi-country effort to identify and catalogue genetic 
similarities and differences in human beings, states on its webpage that race was “an imprecise and mostly socially 
constructed category,” accessed April 1, 2016. http://hapmap.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/citinghapmap.html.  
See also Banton, Racial Theories, 196. López, White by Law, 78. Schabas, Genocide in International Law, 129. Thomas 
Hylland Eriksen, Ethnicity and Nationalism (London: Pluto Press, 2010), 5. Erica Howard, “Race and Racism: Why does 
European Law have Difficulties with Definitions?” The International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial 
Relations (2008), 10. Davis, “Constructing Race”, 7.
85 Quoted in Michael Yudell, Race Unmasked: Biology and Race in the Twentieth Century (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2014), 204.
86 Ibid.
87 Bobo, “Foreword”, x. Banton, Racial Theories, 197, 212. 
88 Hans Vest favors a determination by means of physical characteristics or biological decent over an expansive 
interpretation (Hans Vest, Genozid durch organisatorische Machtapparate (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2002), 120).
89 Lawrence LeBlanc, “The United Nations Genocide Convention and political groups: should the United States propose 
an amendment?,” Yale Journal of International Law (1998), 273.
90 Daniel Ntanda Nsereko, “Genocide: a crime against mankind,” in Substantive and Procedural Aspects of International 
Criminal Law, ed. Gabrielle Kirk McDonald and Olivia Swaak-Goldman (The Hague: Kluwer Law, 2000), 131.
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skin colour, hair, eyes and stature”.91 He too refers to the genetic composition of people and relies 
on hereditary physical traits. Implying that race is genetically transmittable is scientifically baseless 
and furthermore incoherent with the current understanding of race as a social construct rather than 
a biological fact.92 Matthew Lippman claims that “[t]he concept of racial groups is self-evident”93 
and Francis Boyle, agent of the state applicant in the Case on the Application of the Genocide Convention 
before the ICJ argues that “[t]he concepts of racial and religious groups are self-evident”.94 Finally, 
Gerhard Werle and Florian Jessberger define a racial group as a social group whose members 
exhibited the same inherited, visible physical traits, such as skin colour or physical stature.95 They 
too rely on an objective approach, whereby people can be categorized on the basis of their features 
and inherited characteristics. As shown above, there is no gene for race. Race can therefore not be 
inherited. A reliance on heredity should consequently be avoided in defining race. This is confirmed 
by Michael Banton, former Chair of the Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
and an authority in the studies on racial discrimination, who considers race in some cases to have 
no real basis in heredity whatsoever.96
The above mentioned scholarly definitions either avoid defining a racial group or relate 
to outdated conceptions of race, based on the wrongful understanding that there exist clearly 
distinguishable racial groups with distinct physical appearances and qualities.97 There is no 
biological foundation for race. Any kind of categorization of people by means of their features 
is scientifically incorrect and offensive. This raises the question of how race should be correctly 
defined.
Different Approaches to Defining the Victim Groups of Genocide
Art. II Genocide Convention protects four specific groups. The subjective and objective approaches 
to defining these protected groups rival each other.98 An objective approach relies on verifiable, 
hard facts. Neither the views of the victim, the perpetrator nor any third party can influence the 
definition of the group and the membership criteria.99 A subjective approach is based on perception, 
personal opinions and interpretations. The subjective test accepts the group as defined by the 
perpetrator. His view becomes dispositive of the group-defining criteria.100
To objectively define a person by his or her complexion, anatomy or other physical markers, 
assumes that there exist different racial groups, which can be distinguished from each other by 
means of their appearance.101 David Nersessian rightfully concludes that there was a practical 
impossibility of defining groups in any way other than subjectively, namely by utilizing the 
perpetrator’s perception. He notes that the “efforts to define protected groups objectively have 
91 Ibid.
92 See above footnote 84.
93 Matthew Lippman, “Genocide,” in International Criminal Law: Sources, Subjects, and Contents, ed. M. Cherif Bassiouni 
(Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008), 412.
94 Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Supplement to the Application and to the Second Request for the Indication 
of Provisional Measures of Protection submitted by the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, ICJ 
(August 22, 1993), 18.
95 Gerhard Werle and Florian Jessberger, Principles of International Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 
299. The authors do note that the concept of race was “not unproblematic given its abusive usage” (ibid.).
96 Michael Banton, International Action against Racial Discrimination (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 76-82.
97 The domestic US genocide legislation defines a racial group as “a set of individuals whose identity as such is distinctive 
in terms of physical characteristics or biological descent”, thereby apparently relying on a purely objective approach 
(The Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987 [Proxmire Act], US Code § 1093, Title 18, Part 1, Chapter 50A). 
Michael Banton points out that the US is the only country that holds on to the practice of identifying blacks by the 
one-drop rule, a classification that was not applied to any other social category and unknown outside the US (Banton, 
Race and Ethnicity, 2). He also establishes a difference in the European and the US perspective on race (ibid., viii). 
98 Quayle, “Unimaginable Evil”, 368.
99 Nersessian, Genocide and Political Groups, 27.
100 Ibid. 
101 Banton, Racial Theories, 198.
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proved largely artificial, suffer from serious analytical flaws, and in any case bear no relation to the 
group ultimately targeted”.102
In the subjective approach, the perpetrator identifies the victim’s group membership. 
Nevertheless, the identification of the group membership cannot completely be left to the 
perpetrator’s imagination, because this would inevitably lead to a broadening of the exclusive 
victim groups of genocide.103 If the perpetrator alone defines the racial group, he could possibly 
perceive blue-eyed men – or women, for the sake of the argument – as a distinct race. This would 
conflict with the object and purpose of the Genocide Convention, which offers narrow protection 
to a limited number of enumerated groups.
Instead, the subjective approach has to be sufficiently specific and foreseeable in order to 
cohere with the principle of legality. The subsequent section outlines the theory of imagined 
identity, which builds on a subjective approach, and shows its relevance for the crime of genocide. 
Thereafter, the jurisprudence by the ad hoc international criminal tribunals on the protected groups 
of genocide is analyzed. The legal analysis ends with the Darfur Commission’s report as well as 
the jurisprudence by the ICC.
Imagined Identities
Benedict Anderson (1936-2015) was a professor in political science and author of one of the most 
important concepts in political geography, namely that nations are “imagined communities”.104 
Anderson is recognized as one of the most influential scholars of his generation and his book from 
1986 (revised edition 2006), Imagined Communities, is a standard work with worldwide impact across 
academic disciplines.105 He asserts that nationalism was created by a feeling of togetherness in a 
nation state, despite not knowing its other members.106 This feeling was so strong that its members 
were willing to die for their – imagined – nation by serving the nation’s army and participating in 
armed conflicts.107 Other scholars acknowledge that nationalism is commonly viewed as inherently 
irrational in the sense that it transcends considerations of self-interest.108 According to Anderson, 
the nation is a social construct that ties together strangers and creates a sense of togetherness, which 
manifests itself in language, tradition, music, literature and pride of being part of that respective 
nation. Importantly, nationalism is created by beliefs and felt kinship ties. The emphasis is on felt 
– or imagined – subjective claims.109
By applying this concept to a group of people connected to each other not by a nation, but by 
race, ethnicity or religion, a similar construct is created: people perceive likewise persons as similar 
and form groups of like-minded. Simultaneously they perceive others, outside their own group, 
as different.110 Although not necessarily grounded in a real, objective differentiation between the 
groups, this distinction is nevertheless solidified over time, thereby creating two distinct groups: 
“us” and “them”. Ultimately, the groups are not real, but socially constructed and therefore 
imagined.
For the crime of genocide it is essential to pinpoint the perceptions of different identities, the 
“us” versus “them”. This so-called othering occurs in genocide for racial groups as much as for 
the other protected groups. The dichotomies between us and them are emphasized, whereby the 
102 Ibid., 31-32.
103 Ibid., 31.
104 Euan Hague, “Benedict Anderson,” in Key Thinkers on Space and Place, ed. Phil Hubbard and Rob Kitchin (London: Sage 
Publications, 2011), 16.
105 Ibid., 17-19.
106 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 6 and 26.
107 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 7. Also recognized by Russell Hardin, One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 150.
108 Hardin, One for All, 46.
109 Ibid., 147.
110 Guglielmo Verdirame, “The Genocide Definition in the Jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals,” International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly (2000), 592.
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image of the “others” is created, often parallel to creating a new sense of “self”.111 Of significance to 
any genocidal process is the stigmatization of the others as the out-group: they are seen as 
inferior, but simultaneously present a threat to the in-group.112 Any genocide is preceded 
by a process of creation of identities, with the aim of destroying the identity and ultimately 
the existence of the others.113 Gradually, the othering and stigmatization becomes a socially 
accepted way of perceiving outsiders to one’s own group. This process is demonstrated in the 
following examples.
The case of Rwanda exemplarily shows that the Hutu and Tutsi were very similar groups, 
largely sharing the same nationality, religion, language and traditions.114 The German and later the 
Belgian colonizers perceived the Tutsi to be more like them in height and color and established the 
Tutsi as the indigenous elite.115 A Belgian law of 1931 determined that whoever owned more than 
ten cows was a Tutsi and thereby created a wealth-based system of division.116 The introduction of 
identity cards during Belgian colonialism consolidated the membership to the Tutsi, Hutu or 
Twa group and simultaneously implanted the vision of Tutsi superiority; the membership to one 
of the three groups was therefore primarily a result of a social attribution process.117 Jan Pronk 
names Rwanda as an example of imagined communities due to the imagined physical and mental 
superiority of the Tutsi and the inferiority of the Hutu.118 Payam Akhavan furthermore emphasizes 
that the distinction of Hutu and Tutsi “was born of racialist mythology, gradually assumed a 
socially constructed reality, and ultimately defined the population slated for extermination”.119 
The different groups were constructed as a collective imaginary, as social constructs rather than 
objectively defined groups.120
The propaganda preceding the genocide in Rwanda was based on the Hutu’s feeling 
of inferiority and found its valve in a reversing of positions: the Tutsi, who were imagined as 
superior to the Hutu, were inferiorated by means of hate speech, termed “cockroaches” 
and ultimately targeted for extermination.121 The Tutsi were portrayed as the enemy from 
within that needed to be stopped before it swallowed the suppressed Hutu culture.122 
This imagined fear of the other manifested itself in the official propaganda and 
111 Anthonie Holslag, “The Process of Othering from the ‘Social Imaginaire’ to Physical Acts: An Anthropological 
Approach,” Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal 9 (2015), 96. Chalk and Jonassohn, History and 
Sociology of Genocide, 28.
112 Laban Hinton, “Dark Side of Modernity”, 6 and 13.
113 Chalk and Jonassohn, History and Sociology of Genocide, 28, 30. Mark Kielsgard, Responding to Modern Genocide: At the 
Confluence of Law and Politics (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), 77-79.
114 In the words of anthropologist Alex de Wall: “[I]t is rarely possible to tell whether an individual is a Twa, Hutu, or 
Tutsi (…) from his or her height. Speaking the same language, sharing the same culture and religion, living in the 
same places, they are in no sense ‘tribes’, nor even distinct ‘ethnic groups’”, Alex De Waal, “Genocide in Rwanda,” 
Anthropology (1994), 1-2 (emphasis in original). Gregory Stanton also notes that the Hutu and Tutsi shared the same 
language, culture and religion (Gregory Stanton, “Could the Rwandan Genocide Have Been Prevented?,” Journal of 
Genocide Research (2004), 213).
115 The Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Trial Chamber Judgment, September 2, 1998, ICTR-96-4-T, para. 82. Payam Akhavan, “The 
Crime of Genocide in the ICTR Jurisprudence”, Journal of International Criminal Justice (2005), 1000. Beth Van Schaack, 
“Darfur and the Rhetoric of Genocide,” Whittier Law Review 26 (2005), 1120. Amann, “Group Mentality”, 103.
116 Agnieszka Szpak, “National, Ethnic, Racial, and Religious Groups Protected against Genocide in the Jurisprudence of 
the Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals,” European Journal of International Law 23 (2012), 160.
117 Laban Hinton, “Dark Side of Modernity”, 16. Amann, Diane, “Prosecutor v. Akayesu,” American Journal of International 
Law 93 (1999), 195. Alex De Waal, “Group Identity, Rationality, and the State,” Critical Review 11 (1997), 287. De Waal 
notes that the Twa as hunter-gatherers and potters remained outside the Hutu-Tutsi dynamic, given the lowest social 
position of all, namely as ‘remnants of an earlier stage of human evolution’ (ibid., 286).
118 Jan Pronk, “The United Nations After 50 Years,” in Contemporary Genocides: Causes, Cases, Consequences, ed. Albert 
Jongman (Leiden: PIOOM, 1996), xi.
119 Akhavan, “The Crime of Genocide”, 1000.
120 David Deutsch and Niza Yanay, “The Politics of Intimacy: Nazi and Hutu Propaganda as Case Studies,” Journal of 
Genocide Research 18 (2016), 31.
121 Mark Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 41. The 
Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, Amended Indictment, December 18, 1998, ICTR-97-32, 6-7.
122 Holslag, “Process of Othering”, 102. Laban Hinton, “Dark Side of Modernity”, 16 and 20.
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eventually also the personal rhetoric, often reverting to diminutive and dehumanizing 
language.123
A reverse development happened in the Balkans in the early 1990s. The collapse of the League 
of Communists in 1990 and the interconnected disintegration of Yugoslavia into its warring factions 
marked the end of a common Yugoslav national identity. The imagined community of Yugoslavia 
became unimaginable from 1991-1992 onwards.124 For example, the Serbs in Croatia identified 
themselves for decades as Yugoslavs. Due to the events in the early 1990s, however, they started 
perceiving themselves as Serbs in Croatia instead of under the former common denominator of 
Yugoslavs.125 Socially relevant groups were created that perceived each other as distinct. Similarly 
to Rwanda, the dichotomization led to an identification of us versus them.
The theory of imagined identities was for the first time applied to international criminal law in 
the 2005 Report by the Darfur Commission. The Darfur report will be analyzed more in depth in the 
following section. With reference to a scholarly article by Guglielmo Verdirame, the Commission 
emphasized that “collective identities (…) are by their very nature social constructs, ‘imagined’ 
identities entirely dependent on variable and contingent perceptions, and not social facts”.126 While 
the idea of imagined, as opposed to factual or real, identities is appealing because it avoids any 
objective definition of the protected group, it nevertheless has to be coherent with the principle of 
strict legality. The theory of imagined identities, which builds on a subjective approach to group 
membership, cannot go beyond the narrow definition of Art. II Genocide Convention and cannot 
render invalid the principle of foreseeability and specificity. The imagination of the perpetrator 
can, in other words, not exceed the Genocide Convention’s understanding of the protected victim 
groups.
The current understanding of race as a subjective and social concept, with the perception of 
the perpetrator as the key element, points to the application of the theory of imagined identities 
in praxis. The perpetrator perceives a victim as belonging to a different group, which he imagines 
having different and inferior attributes and qualities. This imagined inferiority then gives the 
perpetrator, in his eyes, a justification to discriminate and ultimately to exterminate this imaginary 
group. The identity of the others and their differences to us is passed on from one generation to the 
next by means of narratives. These accounts formulate and solidify the conception of the others’ 
personhood and thereby their identity.127
Such historical and sociological narratives harden prejudices about the victims: the others have 
“always” been different, they have “never” been part of the society at large, but have “persistently” 
chosen to remain in their own community. The imagined social construct of two different groups 
becomes a reality as soon as it is effective. This effectiveness is demonstrated in that the in-group 
treats the out-group (the others) as real. In doing so, the creation of a social reality is revealed that 
eventually entails social and/or legal consequences. This formation of an imagined identity is in 
itself not further disquieting. However, if the effectiveness results in stigmatization, inferiorization, 
dehumanization and ultimately the aim of destruction, the risk of genocide is imminent.128
The example of Rwanda shows this development clearly: prior to the colonialization, the 
Hutu and Tutsi group membership was fluid and unsettled: wealth enabled ascension of the social 
123 Deutsch and Yanay, “Politics of Intimacy”, 22.
124 Robert Hayden, “Imagined Communities and Real Victims: Self-Determination and Ethnic Cleansing in Yugoslavia,” 
in Genocide: An Anthropological Reader, ed. Alexander Laban Hinton (Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 2002), 236-237. 
Hardin, One for All, 156-163.
125 Hayden, “Imagined Communities”, 233. Banton, Racial Theories, 210.
126 United Nations, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General 
(hereafter: Darfur Report), January 25, 2005 (UN Doc. S/2005/60), para. 499 (emphasis in original) with reference to 
Verdirame, “The Genocide Definition”, 592.
127 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 204-205.
128 Gregory Stanton, Countries at Risk Report 2012 (Washington: Genocide Watch, 2012). The report includes a list of eight 
stages of genocide, which was based on a 1996-model. In 2013, Stanton presented a ten stage model, describing 
amongst others the stages of stigmatization (“classification” and “symbolization”), inferiorization (“discrimination”), 
dehumanization and destruction (“extermination”), accessed April 11, 2016. http://www.genocidewatch.org/genocide/
tenstagesofgenocide.html.
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ladder from being a (poor) Hutu to being a (wealthy) Tutsi. Intermarriage between the groups 
was common.129 The introduction of identity cards by the Belgium colonizers changed the picture 
drastically: group membership became more or less permanent and immutable. A person’s identity 
was defined in one of the three categories (Hutu, Tutsi and Twa) and considered innate by means 
of patrilineal heredity of ethnicity.130 The colonial masters created and imposed a largely imaginary 
system of group membership. This system of identification became unalterable, operational and 
therefore also effective once the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa started using their ID-cards.
Race, ethnicity, nationality and religion become operational concepts of group membership 
once an effective system has been put into place. Whether imagined systems are founded 
on fictional or real grounds is irrelevant: distinct groups are created and thereby objectified. 
Thus, effectiveness and operationability determine the membership to a racial, ethnical, 
national or religious group. Or in other words: once a group membership is operational, it 
becomes effective and real.
The next section will analyze selected examples of case law by the ad hoc international criminal 
tribunals as well as the Darfur Commission’s report. It will reveal that jurisprudence has gradually 
shifted from defining the victim groups objectively to defining them subjectively, based primarily 
upon the perception of the perpetrator. It will in particular show that the Darfur Commission 
applied the theory of imagined identity. The jurisprudence of the ICC on the situation of Darfur, 
which largely builds upon the Darfur Commission’s report, will also be analyzed. The ICC’s initial 
steps in dealing with the crime of genocide in the situation of Darfur will provide an outlook on 
future developments in the definition of the protected groups.
Race in International Criminal Jurisprudence
The interpretation by the international criminal tribunals of the crime of genocide and the protected 
groups are far from specific or foreseeable. While this is true for all of the four protected groups, it is 
particularly significant for the racial group. As such, the tribunals’ judgments might challenge the 
principle of legality. For future cases it is important that the tribunals fully recognize and respect 
legal certainty and predictability in their interpretation of the protected groups of genocide.131
The jurisprudence of the ICTR and the ICTY on the group definition is incoherent because 
it varies in its approach to defining the protected groups. Early cases took a primarily objective 
approach, while later cases increasingly relied on the perpetrator’s perception of the victim group, 
thus applying a subjective approach. The following examples reveal the inconsistency of the 
judicial approaches.
ICTR Jurisprudence
The ICTR produced the first case law on the crime of genocide and in particular the racial group. 
In the first ever genocide trial in history, The Prosecutor v. Akayesu, the Trial Chamber defined a 
racial group as follows: “The conventional definition of racial group is based on the hereditary 
physical traits often identified with a geographical region, irrespective of linguistic, cultural, 
national or religious factors”.132 The Trial Chamber did not cite any authority for its definition. This 
primarily objective approach to a racial group is ambiguous since it refers to heredity and implies 
an identification of group members by means of their genetically defined physical traits. As shown 
earlier, a reference to heredity preserves an outdated and contentious method of classifying people. 
The Trial Chamber, however, weakened its statement by referring to “the conventional definition”, 
129 Lyal Sunga, The Emerging System of International Criminal Law: Developments in Codification and Implementation (The 
Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2010), 112. Scott Straus, The Order of Genocide (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2006), 20-21.
130 The Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Trial Chamber Judgment, September 2, 1998, ICTR-96-4-T, para. 171. The Prosecutor v. 
Kayishema and Ruzindana, Trial Chamber Judgment, May 21, 1999, ICTR-95-1-T, para. 523. United Nations, Preliminary 
Report of the Independent Commission of Experts Established in Accordance with Security Council Resolution 935 (1994), 
October 4, 1994 (UN Doc. S/1994/1125 (1994), Annex), para. 45.
131 Caroline Fournet, “The Actus Reus of Genocide,” in Elements of Genocide, ed. Paul Behrens and Ralph Henham 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), 57-58.
132 The Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Trial Chamber Judgment, September 2, 1998, ICTR-96-4-T, paras. 514 and 516.
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yet without determining its accuracy. The judges remained silent on what is considered a non-
conventional definition of race.
Furthermore, the judgment mentions the identification of these traits with a geographical 
region. The Trial Chamber thereby partially resorts to a subjective approach, whereby the term 
“identified” points to the perpetrator’s perception of the victim group’s racial affiliation to its 
geographical location or origin. In Akayesu, the ICTR defined race foremost by heredity. Hereditary 
physical traits are objective, factual elements. The approach taken by the Trial Chamber is therefore 
foremost an objective one.133 However, it also noted that these hereditary traits were often identified 
with a geographical region. The word “often” indicates an ordinary, but not exclusive approach to 
defining race. The word “identity” clearly connects to a person’s perception, thus a subjective act. 
The overall approach taken by the ICTR is therefore a primarily objective approach with certain 
subjective elements.134
Only one year after the Akayesu trial judgment, the same bench of judges rendered the trial 
judgment against Georges Anderson Nderubumwe Rutaganda. It pronounced a more balanced 
definition of the victim group by stating that the membership was a subjective rather than an objective 
concept.135 The Tribunal in case further held that the “victim is perceived by the perpetrator of 
genocide as belonging to a group slated for destruction. In some instances, the victim may perceive 
himself/ herself as belonging to the said group”.136 By emphasizing perception, Rutaganda took a 
subjective approach and shifted away from the primarily objective approach taken in Akayesu.137
The ICTR Bagilishema trial judgment of 2001 demonstrated the difficulties of an objective group 
definition. It held that, although indicative definitions of these four terms have been provided,
the concepts of national, ethnical, racial, and religious groups enjoy no generally or 
internationally accepted definition. Each of these concepts must be assessed in the light 
of a particular political, social, historical, and cultural context. Although membership of 
the targeted group must be an objective feature of the society in question, there is also a 
subjective dimension. 138
Here, in a footnote, the Trial Chamber refers to the above-mentioned report by the Commission of 
Experts on Rwanda and its statement that “to recognise that there exists discrimination on racial 
or ethnic grounds, it is not necessary to presume or posit the existence of race or ethnicity itself as 
a scientifically objective fact”.139 The judgment further reads:
A group may not have precisely defined boundaries (…). Moreover, the perpetrators 
of genocide may characterize the targeted group in ways that do not fully correspond to 
conceptions of the group shared generally, or by other segments of society. In such a case 
(…) if a victim was perceived by a perpetrator as belonging to a protected group, the victim 
could be considered by the Chamber as a member of the protected group, for the purposes 
of genocide.140
133 Matthias Schuster, “The Crime of Genocide Applied in Practice: Selected Aspects of the Jurisprudence of the Ad Hoc 
Tribunals’ Appeals Chambers,” in The Genocide Convention Sixty Years After its Adoption, ed. Christoph Safferling and 
Eckart Conze (The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2010), 216.
134 Ibid., 217.
135 The Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Trial Chamber Judgment, December 6, 1999, ICTR-96-3-T, , para. 56.
136 Ibid. The Kamuhanda and Kajelijeli judgments contain a similar wording, however, they base their subjective approach 
on the perpetrator’s perception only (The Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, Trial Chamber Judgment, January 22, 2004, ICTR-
99-54A-T, para. 630; The Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Appeals Chamber Judgment, December 1, 2003, ICTR-98-44A, para. 
811).
137 Verdirame, “The Genocide Definition”, 592 and 594.
138 The Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Trial Chamber Judgment, June 7, 2001, ICTR-95-1A-T, para. 65.
139 Ibid., para. 65 with reference to United Nations, Final Report of the Commission of Experts, para. 159.
140 The Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Trial Chamber Judgment, June 7, 2001, ICTR-95-1A-T, para. 65.
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In the Bagilishema trial judgment, the ICTR took a purely subjective approach to defining all the 
victim groups of genocide, including the racial group. The perpetrator’s perception of the victims’ 
group membership was crucial: he intended to destroy them because of their perceived or real 
group membership, irrespective of how the group is conceived by other segments of society. In sum, 
the Bagilishema trial judgment took a primarily subjective approach with some objective elements 
and as such further consolidated the innovative, subjective definition of group membership.141 
According to Barbara Lüders, Bagilishema was the turning point in the ICTR’s jurisprudence from 
an objective to a subjective approach.142 The fact that the Kayishema and Ruzindana trial judgment of 
1999 laid the groundwork for a subjective approach challenges this opinion.143 The Kayishema and 
Ruzindana judgment defined an ethnic group as one “whose members share a common language 
and culture; or, a group which distinguishes itself, as such (self identification); or, a group identified 
as such by others, including perpetrators of the crimes (identification of others)”.144 Apparently 
inspired by the Akayesu trial judgment, it defined the racial group as follows: “a racial group is 
based on hereditary physical traits often identified with geography”.145 While the Trial Chamber 
subjectively defined the ethnical group by means of self-identification or identification of others, it 
defined the racial group objectively.
The ICTR Appeals Chamber has not often dealt with the definition of the protected groups of 
genocide. On one rare occasion, the Appeals Chamber in Nahimana et al. recognized the application 
of a subjective approach: “[T]he jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals acknowledges that the 
perception of the perpetrators of the crimes may in some circumstance be taken into account for 
the purposes of determining membership of a protected group”.146 It decided that the attacks on 
Hutu political opponents were not acts of genocide because the victims were acknowledged as 
such and not perceived as Tutsi.147
In 2000, the ICTR in Semanza declared the division of the Rwandan population into three 
ethnical groups a fact of common knowledge.148 Declaring a fact common knowledge removes 
it from being a subject to dispute and includes it into a list of common or universally known 
historical, geographical facts, or the laws of nature, such as the days of the week.149 According to 
the Tribunal, common knowledge also covered those facts that were generally known within a 
tribunal’s territorial jurisdiction.150 The consequence of declaring the ethnic grouping as a fact of 
common knowledge is that no further proof is necessary, since the existence of the Tutsi group as 
a protected ethnic group is determined.151 Although the Trial Chamber emphasized that it could 
not “take judicial notice of matters, which are unadorned legal conclusions”,152 it in effect evaded 
141 Interestingly, in the ICJ Case Concerning Application of Genocide Convention (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and 
Montenegro), the legal representative of Serbia and Montenegro claimed that the ICTR in Bagilishema had adopted 
an exclusively objective approach. According to the representative, the ICTR concluded that the group membership 
should be an objective element of society in question. The legal counsel thereby disregarded that Bagilishema dealt 
with the perpetrator’s perception of the protected group, hence taking into account the subjective elements in defining 
a group membership (Case Concerning Application of Genocide Convention, Document No. CR 2006/43, Public Sitting 
(May 8, 2006), 36-37).
142 Barbara Lüders, Die Strafbarkeit von Völkermord nach dem Römischen Statut für den Internationalen Strafgerichtshof (Berlin: 
Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2004), 57.
143 The Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, Trial Chamber Judgment, May, 21, 1999, ICTR-95-1-T, para. 98.
144 Ibid., para. 98.
145 Ibid.
146 The Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al., Appeals Chamber Judgment, November 28, 2007, ICTR-99-52-A, para. 496.
147 Ibid.
148 The Prosecutor v. Semanza, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion for Judicial Notice and Presumption of Facts Pursuant to 
Rules 94 and 54, November 3, 2000, ICTR-97-20-T, paras. 23, 29, 48(b) and Annex A.
149 Mark Klamberg, Evidence in International Criminal Trials: Confronting Legal Gaps and the Reconstruction of Disputed Events 
(Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013), 472.
150 The Prosecutor v. Semanza, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion for Judicial Notice and Presumption of Facts Pursuant to 
Rules 94 and 54, November 3, 2000, ICTR-97-20-T, para. 23.
151 Schuster, “The Crime of Genocide”, 220.
152 The Prosecutor v. Semanza, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion for Judicial Notice and Presumption of Facts Pursuant to 
Rules 94 and 54, November 3, 2000, ICTR-97-20-T, para. 35. This decision was confirmed by the Appeals Chamber: The 
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any further discussion on the ethnicity of the involved groups and hindered further elaboration on 
the victim groups of the Rwandan genocide. The ICTR Appeals Chamber also took notice of the 
genocide in Rwanda against the Tutsi ethnic group, thereby accepting as common knowledge the 
existence of the Tutsi as a protected group.153 Matthias Schuster laments that the appellate bodies of 
the ad hoc tribunals did not clarify “the law on such a central element of the definition of the crime 
of genocide”.154
ICTY Jurisprudence
In May 1993, acting under Chapter VII of UN Charter, the UN established the ICTY in response to 
mass atrocities then taking place in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.155 The ICTY was the first 
international war crimes tribunal since the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals following the Second 
World War. In one of the Tribunal’s most important cases, the Jelisić judgment, the Trial Chamber 
acknowledged that an objective approach to defining the victim group of genocide was a risky 
undertaking:
to define a... racial group today using objective and scientifically irreproachable criteria would 
be a perilous exercise whose result would not necessarily correspond to the perception of 
the persons concerned by such categorisation. Therefore, it is more appropriate to evaluate 
the status of a... racial group from the point of view of those persons who wish to single 
that group out from the rest of the community. The Trial Chamber consequently elects to 
evaluate membership in a… racial group using a subjective criterion.156
At first sight the Jelisić judgment seemed to allow a victim- as well as a perpetrator-based 
approach (“perception of the persons concerned by such categorization”). However, the 
consecutive sentence makes clear that the perpetrator alone defines the victim group (“point of 
view of those persons who wish to single that group out”). The judgment correctly recognized that 
it was applying a subjective approach.
The Trial Chamber in the judgment against Radoslav Brđanin took a slightly different 
subjective approach by holding that the victim group “may be identified by means of the 
subjective criterion of the stigmatization of the group, notably by the perpetrators of the crime, 
on the basis of its perceived… racial… characteristics. In some instances, the victim may perceive 
himself or herself to belong to the aforesaid group”.157 This judgment provided two possibilities 
to defining the protected groups, namely either a perpetrator- or a victim-based approach. The 
wording “notably by the perpetrators” reveals a primacy of a perpetrator-based approach, which 
is further confirmed in that “in some instances, the victim may perceive himself or herself to belong 
to the aforesaid group”. As a rule, the tribunal seemed to rely on the perpetrator’s perception. 
Occasionally, however, also the victim’s perception could influence the group definition. The 
judges nevertheless demanded objective criteria, without indicating their scope, in holding that 
“the correct determination of the relevant protected group has to be made on a case-by-case basis, 
consulting both objective and subjective criteria. This is so because subjective criteria alone may 
not be sufficient to determine the group targeted for destruction and protected by the Genocide 
Convention”.158 The Trial Chamber acknowledged that a subjective approach alone could cause 
an inadmissible broadening of the protected groups, which would conflict with the principle of 
strict legality and foreseeability. However, the judges did not recognize the possibility of relying 
on a subjective approach that builds on the theory of imagined identities. According to that theory, 
Prosecutor v. Semanza, Appeals Chamber Judgment, May 20, 2005, ICTR-97-20-A, para. 192.
153 The Prosecutor v. Karemera et al., Decision on the Prosecutor’s Interlocutory Appeal of Decision on Judicial Notice, June 
16, 2006, ICTR-98-44-AR73, paras. 33-38.
154 Schuster, “The Crime of Genocide”, 220.
155 Established by Security Council Resolution S/RES/827 (25 May 1993).
156 The Prosecutor v. Jelisić, Appeals Chamber Judgment, December 14, 1999, IT-95-10-A, para. 70. 
157 The Prosecutor v. Brđanin, Trial Chamber Judgment, September 1, 2004, IT-99-36-T, para. 683.
158 Ibid., para. 684.
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the prosecutor would have to prove that the perpetrator perceived the victim group as belonging 
to a group racially distinct from his own and therefore targets its members with the intention of 
destroying them.
The ICTY jurisprudence, similarly to that of the ICTR, reveals a gradual shift from an objective 
to a more subjective approach in defining the protected groups of genocide. Nevertheless, neither 
ad hoc tribunal ever took a purely subjective approach and always required some objectively 
definable components, however without sketching out their contours.
Apart from the jurisprudence by the two trial chambers of the ad hoc tribunals, there has been 
limited case law on the international level defining the protected groups of genocide. This article 
will not examine the jurisprudence of the Nuremberg or Tokyo Tribunals, the ECCC, the Special 
Panels of the Dili District Court, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon or the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone, some of which do not even have subject-matter jurisdiction over the crime of genocide. 
However, the Commission of Inquiry on Darfur comprehensively dealt with the definition of the 
protected groups and referred to imagined identities. Its report is therefore of particular interest 
for the further analysis.
Report by the Darfur Commission
In 2004, a UN Security Council resolution requested the establishment of the Darfur Commission. 
Its tasks were to immediately investigate reports of violations of international law in Darfur, 
to determine whether acts of genocide had occurred, and to identify the perpetrators of such 
violations.159 As a Commission of Inquiry, the Darfur Commission was not a judicial organ. 
However, it was headed by renowned ICTY Judge and Professor of Law Antonio Cassese and 
was mandated to make a legal assessment of the situation in Darfur. The Commission produced a 
comprehensive quasi-legal report that resembles a trial judgment, but was not legally binding.160 
The report notes that although “it is not a judicial body… the Commission adopted an approach 
proper to a judicial body”.161 The methods applied and the analysis performed were undoubtedly 
of a legal character.
The Commission was challenged by the fact that crimes were committed against different 
tribal groups (chiefly the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa tribes) that did not appear to make up ethnic 
groups distinct from the ethnic group to which the attackers belonged.162 The Commission found 
that the tribes who supported the insurgents were increasingly perceived as African, while those 
supporting the government were perceived as Arabs, even though there were no objective grounds 
for such distinctions, since both groups shared the same faith and spoke the same language.163 The 
rift between the tribes, and the political polarization around the rebel opposition to the central 
authorities, coupled with the growing insistence of some circles and the media on such an Arab-
African divide, contributed to “the consolidation of the contrast and gradually created a marked 
polarization in the perception and self-perception of the groups concerned”.164
The Darfur Commission determined that the formation process of perceiving another group 
as distinct usually originated in historical and social grounds. The others were perceived as making 
up a different and opposed group. The process “gradually hardens and crystallizes into a real and 
factual opposition. It thus leads to an objective contrast”.165 Despite originating in perception, the 
groups eventually became objectively distinguishable groups.166 Thereby the Darfur Commission 
seemingly added an additional category to the existing objective and subjective approaches in 
159 UN Doc. S/RES/1564 (September 18, 2004), para. 12.
160 Darfur Report, UN Doc. S/2005/60 (January 25, 2005).
161 Darfur Report, para. 14. 
162 Ibid., para. 508. 
163 Ibid., paras. 508 and 509. While there might be other markers, the Commission explicitly mentions religion and 
language.
164 Ibid., para. 509.
165 Ibid., para. 500.
166 Ibid., para. 500.
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defining the victim groups of genocide, namely an objectified subjective approach.167 According 
to that approach, an initially subjective view of a group’s differentness becomes objective in the 
course of time if it is passed on from one generation to the next. It is, however, unclear how much 
time would have to pass in order for an objectified approach to occur. The Darfur Report does not 
answer this question. It could be assumed that a subjective perception could become objectified in 
the course of a generation, perhaps an even shorter period of time.
Not only did the Darfur Commission construct a new approach to defining the protected 
groups of genocide, it also mentioned imagined identities:
the approach taken to determine whether a group is a (fully) protected one has evolved 
from an objective to a subjective standard to take into account that collective identities… are 
by their very nature social constructs, ‘imagined’ identities entirely dependent on variable 
and contingent perceptions, and not social facts, which are verifiable in the same manner as 
natural phenomena or physical facts.168
The Darfur Commission finds that the protected groups of genocide are social constructs rather 
than social facts. Essentially, the victim groups are imagined identities based on the perception 
of their differentness. In its essence, the Darfur Report describes the phenomenon of othering, 
which has been mentioned above. In the case of Darfur, the process of othering was revealed by 
the creation of the binaries of Arab and African tribes, the latter being portrayed as inferior. The 
Commission found that a growing polarization of identities increasingly led to a consolidation of 
the contrasts between the tribes.169 Eventually, the concerned tribes perceived themselves as either 
African or Arab and began making up distinct groups. Derogatory epithets with the intention 
of stigmatizing, inferiorating and ultimately dehumanizing the others further intensified the 
othering.170 John Hagan and Wenona Rymond-Richmond recognized that “[i]t was when the 
imposed meaning of race by others became more starkly binary and stigmatic, separating ‘us’ from 
‘them’, that genocide could begin. When President al-Bashir [of Sudan] collectively identified the 
selected groups as ‘Zourga’, he opened a door to stigmatization and violence.”171
In sum, the Darfur Commission applied an objectified subjective approach and considered the 
process of othering. Most importantly, the Commission acknowledged the concept of imagined 
identities as a basis to define the protected groups of genocide. It thereby took a giant leap in 
defining the victim groups and translated the process of othering into a valid legal consideration. 
In doing so, the Commission recognized the importance of social processes, irrespective of their 
objective recognition. Genocide is precisely about the creation of identities, the stigmatization and 
dehumanization of the victim group, defined by the perpetrator only. In acknowledging the legal 
importance of social constructs, the Darfur Commission provided for a legally sound definition of, 
amongst others, the racial group. Whether the racial group has an objective existence is, according 
to this innovative approach, not important, as long as the perpetrator perceives the group as racially 
distinct from his own and treats it inferiorly, with the ultimate aim of destroying it.
ICC Jurisprudence
In March 2005, the UN Security Council referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC Prosecutor 
because it continued to constitute a threat to international peace and security.172 The referral was 
to a large extent based on the findings of the Darfur Commission. Subsequently, the Prosecutor 
opened an investigation against the sitting President of Sudan and Commander-in-Chief of the 
Sudanese Armed Forces, Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir, and issued two arrest warrants in 2009 
167 Nersessian, Genocide and Political Groups, 32.
168 Darfur Report, para. 499 (emphasis in original). 
169 Ibid., para. 510.
170 Ibid., para. 511.
171 John Hagan and Wenona Rymond-Richmond, Darfur and the Crime of Genocide (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009), xxii (emphasis added).
172 UN Doc. S/RES/1593 (2005) of 31 March 2005.
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and 2010, respectively, listing ten counts of crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide.173 
With regard to the crime of genocide, the judges of the Pre-Trial Chamber found that the three 
targeted tribes of the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa, appeared all to have “Sudanese nationality, 
similar racial features, and a shared Muslim religion”.174 They could therefore not be classified as 
different national, racial or religious groups. The judges discussed whether the three tribes were 
distinct ethnicities, which was answered affirmatively “as there are reasonable grounds to believe 
that each of the groups… has its own language, its own tribal customs and its own traditional 
links to its lands”.175 With reference to the ICJ judgment on the Case Concerning the Application of 
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. 
Serbia and Montenegro) of 26 February 2007, the majority judges refrained from further exploring 
the issue of “whether a wholly objective (based on anthropological considerations), a wholly 
subjective (based only upon the perception of the perpetrators), or a combined objective/subjective 
approach”176 should be adopted, because they considered it unnecessary to further explore this 
issue for the purpose of the decision.177
Despite the lack of clarification by the majority, the dissenting opinion by Judge Ušacka 
promises further debate about the concept and contours of protected groups.178 Referring to the 
jurisprudence by the ad hoc tribunals, she noted that subjective criteria, like the stigmatization of 
the group by the perpetrators, as well as objective criteria, like the particulars of a given social or 
historical context, had to be considered in the definition of the protected groups of genocide.179 Judge 
Ušacka dissented in the classification of the targeted groups as three distinct ethnicities. Instead, 
she suggested to define the protected group as a single ethnic group of the “African tribes”, since 
all three groups were a “perceived unitary entity, which is in turn comprised of smaller groups, 
including the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa”.180 It is interesting that Judge Ušacka defines the victim 
groups as tribes, while the Darfur Commission determined that tribes were not a protected group 
of the crime of genocide, unless they also constituted a distinct racial, national, ethnical or religious 
group.181 However, Judge Ušacka’s classification coheres with the International Law Commission 
(ILC) and its Draft Code of Crimes of 1996, according to which genocide covered acts committed 
against members of a tribal group.182 Of significance to the discussion on imagined identities is the 
fact that the majority in the Omar Al-Bashir decision recognized the different approaches of defining 
the protected groups of genocide, but did not want to position itself, whereas Judge Ušacka clearly 
relied on perception and thereby a wholly subjective approach.
Recent jurisdiction by the ICC reveals a continued trend of relying on perception rather 
than objective, factual realities. In the Bosco Ntaganda case, which dealt with war crimes rather 
than genocide, the ICC repeatedly mentioned the notion of perception. For example, it referred 
to victims “perceived to be non-Itema”,183 “those perceived to be non-originaires”184 or an attack 
173 Following an appeal by the Prosecutor against the decision by the Pre-Trial Chamber I not to include genocide into the 
first warrant of arrest, genocide was included into the counts and a second arrest warrant issued. Accessed May 26, 
2016, http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/AlBashirEng.pdf.
174 The Prosecutor v. Al-Bashir, Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Al-Bashir, 
March 4, 2009, ICC-02/05-01/09, para. 136.
175 Ibid., para. 137.
176 Ibid., p. 48, footnote 152.
177 Ibid.
178 Ibid., Separate and Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Anita Ušacka, paras. 24-26. Fanny Martin, “The Notion of 
‘Protected Group’ in the Genocide Convention and its Application,” in The UN Genocide Convention: A Commentary, ed. 
Paola Gaeta (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 127.
179 The Prosecutor v. Al-Bashir, Separate and Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Anita Ušacka, para. 23.
180 Ibid., paras. 25-26.
181 Darfur Report, para. 496.
182 ILC, Report on the work of its forty-eighth session (UN Doc. A/51/10, 45), commentary 9.
183 The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the 
Prosecutor Against Bosco Ntaganda, June 9, 2014, ICC-01/04-02/06, para. 19. 
184 Ibid.
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on “those perceived to belong to ethnic groups”.185 Whether or not the victims objectively 
were members of these groups appears irrelevant, as long as the perpetrator treats them 
as such.
Summary of Judicial Approaches to Race
Apart from a purely objective approach to defining the protected groups of genocide, there are 
three possible subjective approaches: First, a perpetrator-based approach, where the perpetrator 
perceives the victim as belonging to a different group.186 Secondly, a victim-based approach, in 
which the victim perceives him- or herself as belonging to a group distinct from the perpetrator’s.187 
Lastly, an approach, which considers the perpetrator’s as well as the victim’s perception.188 The 
Darfur Commission apparently added yet another approach, namely the objectified subjective 
approach, whereby a subjective approach over time is hardened and acquires objectivity. The 
majority of judgments by the ad hoc tribunals favored a subjective approach based on the perception 
of the perpetrator, with due consideration of objective elements.189 These objective elements, 
however, remain undefined.
Recent jurisprudence suggests a trend of describing a racial group as a social construct, thus 
gradually abolishing contentious objective attributes.190 This development should be welcomed 
because it coheres with the genocidal dynamics. A perpetrator singles out for destruction a group 
that he considers to be different and inferior from his own. Whether the victim group is objectively 
different from the perpetrator is insignificant, as long as he perceives it to be. In addition, a 
subjective approach to race reflects the contemporary notion of the concept as a social construct or 
an imagined identity.
Nevertheless, a subjective approach that predominantly draws on the perception of the 
perpetrator, will not satisfactorily define the victim group. With an exclusive reliance on 
the perpetrator’s perception, virtually any kind of group, imaginary or real, could become 
a target of genocide. International criminal law cannot permit the crime to be determined 
by the perpetrator alone, because the law was intended to exclusively protect the national, 
religious, ethnic and racial groups.191 The perception of differentness, upon which the subjective 
approach is built, has therefore to be restricted to the four groups in order to accord with 
the principle of legality.
The combination of an objective and a subjective perpetrator-based approach will not lead 
to a coherent result either. In Brđanin, the ICTY took precisely such a mixed approach, which 
is unsatisfactory because it does not disclose what objective elements are required for the legal 
definition of the protected group.192 The legal certainty and foreseeability are not strengthened 
by such an undefined approach. The weakness of this mixed approach can be demonstrated 
by a hypothetical example: If the definition of the protected groups is left to the fantasy of the 
perpetrator, then he could – theoretically – perceive women as a different group and single them 
out for destruction. These women are also an objective group, into which they were born and to 
which they have an irreversible chromosomal membership. If a racial group is defined as a group 
that is perceived as being different from another group, should women be classified as a different 
185 Ibid., para. 20.
186 Lüders, Die Strafbarkeit von Völkermord, 55.
187 Carola Lingaas, “The Elephant in the Room: The Uneasy Task of Defining Race in International Criminal Law,” 
International Criminal Law Review 15 (2015), 509-511.
188 Ibid.
189 Ibid., with a comprehensive overview and graphic illustration of all relevant cases. See also Schuster, “The Crime of 
Genocide”, 218-219 and Berster, “Article II”, 103.
190 William Schabas, The UN International Criminal Tribunals: the Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 169.
191 Szpak, “National, Ethnic, Racial, and Religious Groups”, 164. David Nersessian, “The Razor’s Edge: Defining and 
Protecting Human Groups under the Genocide Convention,” Cornell International Law Journal 36 (2003), 312-313. 
Schabas, “The Crime of Genocide in the Jurisprudence,”, 456. Schabas, “Groups Protected”, 384.
192 Schuster, “The Crime of Genocide”, 218.
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race, because a male perpetrator could perceive them as such? This is obviously not the object and 
purpose of the genocide provisions.
Since apparently neither the objective nor the subjective approach nor a combination of both 
will result in a satisfactory definition a racial group, perhaps the theory of imagined identities 
will. The following conclusion will reveal that the theory of imagined identities can clear up the 
ambiguities and legal uncertainties.
Conclusion
International criminal jurisprudence increasingly acknowledges that collective identities are social 
constructs, so-called imagined identities that entirely depend on variable perceptions and not on 
facts.193 The four protected groups do not necessarily have to be objectively verifiable, but moreover 
depend on the perception of their differentness. This recognition should lead the legal community 
to accommodate for collective identities in general and race in particular. As suggested above, a 
purely subjective approach that builds on the perpetrator’s perception and fantasy violates the 
principle of legality. According to that principle, criminal provisions have to be as specific and 
clear as possible in order to allow the perpetrator to foresee the consequences of his behavior and 
enable a court to pass judgments in a provable and consistent way. An expansion of the protected 
groups to include any subjectively perceived victim group would not pass the scrutiny of a court. 
However, the theory of imagined identities accommodates for the principles of foreseeability and 
specificity. Over the course of time, any initially subjective and imagined differences between the 
groups become solidified, effective and real, thereby providing the courts with the objectivity 
required in order to determine the victim groups of genocide.
By relying foremost on the perpetrator’s perception of the victim group, the subjective 
approach also accommodates for contemporary views on race. Race is a social construct. There is 
no objective foundation for race, and an objective approach to determining the racial victim group 
in the crime of genocide is particularly problematic. As such, the perpetrator’s perception of the 
victims’ membership to a racial group becomes determinative for their protection from genocide. 
If the perpetrator perceives the victims as members of a distinct racial group, they are granted 
protection by the Genocide Convention.
The Darfur Commission’s objectified subjective approach to defining the protected groups 
of genocide was innovative and ground-breaking. It relied on Benedict Anderson’s theory of 
imagined communities, which was extrapolated into a theory of imagined identities, based on the 
victim’s perceived or actual membership to one of the four protected group of genocide. In the 
theory of imagined identity, the victims’ identification and group membership are determined by 
their effectiveness and operationability; as such they are treated as objective and real. For future 
criminal cases, in which the determination of a racial group is an issue, the respective court should 
not hesitate to apply the theory of imagined identities. It is a novel, contemporary and legally 
sound approach that allows courts to better tackle a difficult and sensitive topic: the issue of group 
membership and in particular race. The theory of imagined identity enables the identification of 
the racial group in that the group gains social and legal relevance once it is treated as real. In other 
words, if the perpetrator perceives his victims as members of a distinct racial group and treats 
them as such, namely by inferiorating and stigmatizing, the group acquires objectivity. Despite 
their imagined identity, the members of the racial victim group acquire an objectified existence by 
being treated as real.
Ultimately, the existence of a victim group is an issue of evidence: the prosecution would 
have to prove the perpetrator’s perception rather than the objective existence of the group. Race is 
thereby removed from the objective elements of the crime, the acts reus. This solution is coherent 
with the principle of legality, whereby courts may not create a new criminal offence, but can adapt 
provisions to changing social conditions, such as broadening the actus reus.194 This is in essence the 
conclusion of the ICTR Muhimana trial judgment, according to which
193 Verdirame, “The Genocide Definition”, 592.
194 Antonio Cassese, Cassese’s International Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 32.
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[t]he Prosecution also has the burden of proving either that the victim belongs to the targeted 
ethnic, racial, national, or religious group or that the perpetrator of the crime believed that 
the victim belonged to the group.195
Muhimana thus gives the prosecution an alternative between proving the objective existence of a 
racial group, which would not be feasible, or the proof of the perpetrator’s belief that the victim 
was member of such a group. In effect, it would result in releasing the racial group from the actus 
reus and fully including it into the mental elements, the mens rea.
The prosecution is thereby tasked to prove the perpetrator’s intent to commit a genocidal 
act as well as the special intent to destroy a group. The protected group of genocide itself is 
also added to the prosecutorial burden. This might seem an unachievable task. However, 
the perpetrator’s perception of the victim group will inevitably manifest itself in his behavior. 
As has been demonstrated above, the othering of the victim group becomes observable in any 
pre-genocidal process. The perpetrator’s behavior becomes the key to determining the othering 
and his understanding of the victim group. The behavior becomes apparent in posters, books, 
pamphlets, but also radio broadcasts, personal statements, correspondence and the like. If this 
behavior is characterized by othering, namely the dehumanization of the victims, there is a clear 
and unequivocal indication of his perception of the group and the ensuing genocidal intent. The 
perpetrator’s behavior is observable and will provide the foundation for a legal classification of the 
victim group. The solution lies in the mind of the perpetrator and in the way that he perceives the 
victim group. The legal definition of the national, racial, ethnical and religious group in the crime 
of genocide has to be seen through the eyes of the perpetrator.
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